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On 'November 17 and 19, 1993 The pro-NAFTA forces used economic arguments in support of free trade They asserted Increased trade wrth Mexrco would boost U S exports and growth By ehminatmg barriers to trade rn the Mexican economy, NAFTA would enhance U S access to a market already accouuting for nearly 10 percent of total U S exports, or more than $40 bilhon Moreover, since U S ta.rnYFs averaged only 4 percent, whrle Mexico's were closer to 20 percent, a free trade pact I / actually forced Mexico to do most of the market hberalizatron Also, proponents churned that NAFTA would lead to the net creation of 200,000 high wage export Jobs by 1995 Finally, the NAFTA met key U S forergn pohcy objectives of keeping Mexico on a democratic, free market I I path A stronger, more prosperous Mexico served U S pohtical and economic interests rernforcmg Mexican cooperation on narcohcs and illegal immigration Equally passionate, the arm-NAFTA forces' chief argument was that as Mexmo rarsed its industrial potential, its low wages would make their products less costly The movement of U S firms to Mexrco would result in a massrve loss of manufactunng jobs m Amenca Also, the projected nse m unemployment would tngger major dechnes m U S wage levels and lower hvmg -_ --standards Thts argument was famously captured in Ross Perot's claim of a "giant suckmg -----_IM. sound" of U S jobs moving to Mexrco In addition to the unemployment threat crted by L--protectromsts, several other issues emerged m the debate The first was a growmg concern by U S envrronmentalists that rising economrc activrty would worsen Mexico's environmental situatron The envn-onmentahsts crted the ecological disaster in Mextco's maqurla belt south of _-----.
------____ c the RIO Grande, which had engendered serious water and an pollution problems on the U S side In their book, The Mafia Debate, Delal Bauer and Sidney Weintraub state, "in Washington, rt is I probably easier to orgamze a coahtion against somethmg than rt 1s in favor of somethmg " The I political coahtron formed in oppositron to NAFTA aptly proves this pomt Such politraans and I I issue/advocates on the liberal and conservative wmgs of the U S pohtrcal spectrum, such as I I entrepreneur Ross Perot, Repubhcan pohtician and Washington pundit Pat Buchanan, consumer I I rights advocate Ralph Sader, and former Democratic Cahfornia Governor Jerry Brown all were / I umtecl m rabid opposnion to NAFTA U S organized labor, pnncrpally led by the largest umon -.
federation, the AFL-CIO, stood staunchly m the arm-NAFTA camp Facing sharply dechning ---Tr-/ memb,ershp, the AFL-CIO argued forcefully that KAFTA would result in the relocatron of _.------thousands of U S compames to Mexico causing massive job losses Also, the AFL-CIO feared I that rn, the dynamrc economrc environment engendered by KAFTA, new U S job creation would hkely be non-muon Many U S labor leaders saw NAFTA as a politrcal pact aimed at supporting an unpopular, corrupt, and authoritarian government in Mexico ' Labor's strong posmon agamst I NAFTA weakened the Democratic Party's wrll to support this free trade agreement Another I I strong ,al.ly of the anti-NAFTA forces were California and Florida producers of sugar, grapes, oranges, avocados and other crops where Mexico was perceived to hold a price advantage. In I I Flonda:s Dade County alone, the Farm Bureau estunated that NAFTA would result in farm job losses totalling 17,000 ' Obviously not all U S farmers were anti-NAFTA, U S corn, wheat, I soybean farmers were well positioned to benefit from the opening of the Mexrcan market U S I I envrrox$nental groups also generally came out against NAFTA These groups believed that uncontrolled growth would aggravate Mexico's environmental woes and worsen U S pollution along the border U S consumer groups also jomed the NAFTA debate expressmg concerns Conclusion President Chnton's success in creatmg a broad coalitron in favor of NAFTA was one of his greatest legrslative victories The President's use of a ratronal approach on trade pohcy premised on the rrnportance of free trade to U S economic security gave the intellectual fiber to the pohtrcal debate Later the President's savvy strategy to neutralize the enwonmental movement by negotiating the side agreements weakened the opposrtion The President's ability to secure the support of the former Presidents, his public speaking campaign's direct appeal to the people, Gore's debate victory over Ross Perot, and the President's flexibility in cuttmg backroom deals wrth undecided Congressmen all were integral building blocks of a classic politrcal campaign to manage an unwieldy political process Finally, President Chnton, a Chief Executive who has been been c)itrcized for lack of true convection and principle, demonstrated on thrs issue the vision and leadership to fight for a controversial Issue he deeply beheved to be in Amerrca's interest, and used all of the powers of the Presidency, as well as his own considerable talents, to set America
